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The option to have multiple children could transform China’s economy. 
When the Communist Party of China announced in November 2012 its decision to relax its one-child 
policy, it predictably made headlines but raised fewer eyebrows than it would have had this happened 
30 years ago. Back then, population policy was so stringent that heavy fines were levied on couples who 
had a second child, while those expecting a third were forced to abort it. China’s main concern then was 
meeting the needs of a burgeoning population, which grew from 540 million in 1949 to 940 million in 
1976. 
The one-child policy, however, has led to a demographic situation where more children is the solution, 
and not the problem.  China’s current Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is about 1.5, and the aim is to raise it to 
1.8, in order to achieve and remain at a total population of 1.5 billion. Part of a solution would permit 
citizens to have a second child if either parent is an only child – this was allowed previously, but only if 
both parents were the only child. Such a policy could potentially help boost TFR, though there is no 
guarantee that the populace will do as their leaders wish. 
“Letting people have more kids is one thing, but it is more important to create favourable social 
conditions for people to have kids,” says Peng Xizhe, Professor of Population and Development at Fudan 
University in China. “Focusing exclusively on population issues may not solve the problems of a shrinking 
population and a rising aging one.” 
One-child policy, no-child reality 
Peng, who was a speaker at the inaugural SMU China Forum, described how young Chinese adults 
hesitate to have children at all, citing the challenges in balancing parenthood and an increasingly 
competitive labour market. 
“Based on the example of Singapore and other countries,” Peng tells Perspectives@SMU, “what China 
needs to do is not just focus on population issues but on things such as social services and gender 
equality. For example, in European countries there are community nurseries to help relieve the burden 
on young mothers. We can also convince employers to adopt flexible working arrangements, and 
thereby causing less harm to employees’ career prospects.” 
Career prospects are a main concern for young Chinese. According to official estimates, the number of 
unemployed university graduates stands at over three million and rising. These jobless and 
underemployed graduates - colloquially referred to an ant tribe – struggle to get by on their exceedingly 
low wages. Like ants, they congregate and live in tight, overcrowded apartments often in the most 
impoverished places of China’s biggest cities, where inflated house and rental prices continue to rise. In 
such a scenario, having children is understandably of low priority. 
It is perhaps in this context that Chinese Premier Le Keqiang’s urbanisation drive should be understood – 
as a failed attempt to create more jobs and better living conditions for Chinese graduates through the 
creation of more urban space. The outcome of which are the expansive empty shells of gleaming 
buildings built on a delusive economy, in what have become infamously known as China’s Ghost Cities. 
“The idea of developing cities to absorb university graduates is a very naïve one,” says Peng. “In order to 
absorb this kind of young university graduates, China really needs to upgrade its economy from manual-
intensive activities to investment- or technology-intensive activities.” 
Integrated changes 
The reforms that emerged following the third plenum are aimed at precisely the kind of economic 
upgrading which Peng talks about. For example, the reforms to the hukou system, which has been 
tweaked to facilitate migration to small and medium-sized cities, which in turn could lead to the 
economy’s transformation. That is easier said than done, of course. 
“The change of migration pattern alone will not make much difference until small and medium-sized 
cities will actually provide enough jobs for the newcomers,” cautions Chung Wai Keung, Assistant 
Professor of Sociology at SMU. “There is however no guarantee that this is going to happen.” 
Redirecting migration to smaller cities could also help in increasing TFR, Chung tells Perspectives@SMU, 
because “competition is less fierce in smaller cities, and probably people are more willing to have a 
second child. However, we are pretty sure the Chinese urbanites are just like those who live in Singapore, 
Taipei, Seoul and Hong Kong, in that they are less likely to have more than one kid.” 
Therefore, it is a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation: Until there is enough migration into the smaller 
cities, businesses will not take off.  However, without thriving businesses to employ the new migrants to 
the smaller cities, young Chinese will keep going to the megacities, and TFR will continue to dwindle. As 
a result, social security systems will come under increased pressure as Chinese society ages rapidly, but 
even an increase in population numbers might not help; not immediately, at least.  
“’Increasing population to support and contribute to the social security system cannot be the way to 
strengthen it, as society will need to wait for more than 20 years until all these newborns can start to 
contribute,” says Chung.  
In that regard, improving the TFR is as much an objective of the reforms as it is a method of achieving 
them i.e. increasing population to support and contribute to the social security system, which in turns 
gives the populace the security that frees them to, hopefully, procreate. 
“What we need is an integrated policy package,” says Peng. “If we only focus on slowing down aging or 
reforming the pension system on their own, it might not be enough. It has to be an integrated policy 
package so that many policies can work together.” 
